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The article covers  almost half a century of strikes which took place in industrial companies in Brussels, beginning with the major 
strike in the winter of 1960-61 until 2010. The selection of these labour disputes  was based either on certain characteristics of the 
disputes, such as their harshness and symbolic character, or on their emblematic character with respect to the Brussels  economic 
reality of the company concerned. 
The article focuses in particular on two major periods. The first period corresponds  to the end of the post-war economic boom and 
was  marked by some hard, long and offensive strikes  regarding working conditions. In particular, they brought to the fore the ques-
tion of the position of ‘foreign’ workers in work or-
ganisations  as well as in the world of trade unions. 
The second period covers  the beginning of the 
1980s until 2010, and had the economic crisis, 
unemployment and new managerial policies  as  a 
backdrop. The disputes  were defensive, with the 
negotiation of social plans  related to restructuring 
and the shutting down of sites  as their main issue. 
The question of the respect of union rights  was  also 
a reason for the disputes.
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1. This  article draws a parallel between the evolution of the industrial 
fabric of the Brussels  region and the labour disputes in private-sector 
companies. The period analysed covers  almost half a century, and be-
gins  with the major strike in the winter of 1960-61 and ends in 2010 
with the labour dispute at Godiva. 
2. The disputes  discussed in this  article were open disputes, with 
strikes  being an essential aspect. This  results in a simplistic view of la-
bour disputes, in the sense that the absence of strikes  does  not indi-
cate the absence of industrial tensions. A strike is often just a  method 
of action used as  a last resort, with a  significant part of the labour dis-
pute remaining ‘latent’ or ‘at a low intensity’, which makes it difficult for 
the outside observer to understand. 
3. A qualitative methodology has  been used. This choice is  partly 
based on the fact that the available statistical data are scarce and im-
precise from a  geographical point of view [Vandaele, 2010 and Gracos, 
2011]. The days of strikes were counted based on the location of head 
offices, which biases  the regional analyses  due to their concentration in 
Brussels. Furthermore, the approach used allows a more detailed 
analysis  of the dynamics  at work, which is  important due to the fact 
that a strike may be defensive or offensive, long-lasting or short-lived, 
etc. Its  objects and issues may be varied (working conditions, remu-
nerations, safeguarding of employment, negotiation of a social plan, 
etc.) and often numerous. Moreover, stakeholders  may develop a vari-
ety of strategies  and tactics  to influence the balance of power and as-
sert their interests: strike picket, detention, police, penalty payment, 
bailiff, demonstration, etc. 
4. While the qualitative approach seems  to be the most appropriate, 
it does have its  limits. Among these is  the question of available sources. 
The collective labour relations  in Brussels  have not been the object of 
many written works, thus  requiring major research work based on inter-
views with contact people – essentially union representatives  and paid 
officials  – and a non-systematic analysis of journals  – such as Année 
sociale, Contradictions  and La Revue Nouvelle – as well as the daily 
and weekly press. The period considered and the abundance of facts 
led us to choose only the most significant disputes in terms of social 
dynamics. Admittedly, the choices  made involve a certain amount of 
subjectivity. 
5. The analysis  proposed is  based on three major ‘moments’, namely 
the strike in the winter of 1960-61 against the single law, the end of the 
‘post-war economic boom’ with essentially offensive and qualitative 
disputes, and the decades  from 1980 to 2010, with defensive disputes 
whose main issue was the negotiation of social plans. 
1. Brussels and the major strike of 1960-61
6. At the moment of the 1960-61 strike, Brussels  was  the biggest 
industrial city in Belgium in terms of employment. Within the 19 munici-
palities, a little more than 166,000 people worked in industry, compared 
with nearly 100,000 in Liège, 87,000 in Antwerp, 56,000 in Charleroi 
and 48,000 in Ghent. However, in terms of ‘class consciousness’ and 
‘fighting spirit’, it appeared to be lagging behind urban centres  such as 
Liège, as well as Antwerp and Ghent in Flanders, i.e. ‘regions where 
working-class  traditions are alive, where social struggles  have always 
been ardent, where urban life shapes  the political consciousness and 
where the working-class  districts  preserve specific traits  (e.g. the min-
ing villages) as  creators and guardians of the working-class  conscious-
ness’ [Bolle de Bal, 1961]. This  analysis  is  shared by Féaux, according 
to whom ‘it is  typical to observe that the strike was  especially solid in 
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7. In Brussels, ‘no declaration of a  general strike or a return to work 
was  made by the Brussels  regional FGTB’ [Féaux, 1963]. The strike 
there was  led mainly by workers from the public sector, who were par-
ticularly affected by the proposed single law [Connan and Lebrun, 
2011], from the metal industry and, more sporadically, from the port, 
tramways  and large shops. There were demonstrations almost daily. In 
total, the strike lasted nearly three weeks in Brussels  and five weeks in 
the most combative regions, and left a  deep mark on the trade union 
movement.1
2. The dispute at the end of the ‘post-war economic boom’ 
8. In 1961, industrial employment began to decrease in the capital 
[De Beule, 1994]. Between 1964 and 1972, Brussels  lost 60,000 indus-
trial jobs [Godfroid, 1998], i.e. just over a third of the jobs  which existed 
at the beginning of the 1960s. These losses  were largely due to the 
‘relocations’ outside the city and in particular the district of Halle-
Vilvoorde. According to Bauwin [1976], no less  than 167 industries  left 
Brussels  between 1960 and 1974, taking 15,600 jobs with them. The 
companies which left the city were fairly large for the most part. The 
disappearance of activities was mainly due to the small companies. 
9. In the socioeconomic context of the ‘Golden Sixties’, these job 
losses did not lead to a particular dispute. Although industrial employ-
ment was on the decline, there were still a considerable number of jobs 
thanks  to the development of services. The disputes, which marked the 
social history of Brussels, occurred mainly in the first months  of 1970 
and involved the improvement of working conditions. These disputes 
were very harsh as  well as characteristic of the social climate of the 
time,2 and took place at the Citroën factory in Forest, the Michelin fac-
tory in Sint-Pieters-Leeuw [Shin, 2012] and the Nestor Martin factory in 
Ganshoren. 
10. In its  comparative analysis  of the disputes during the first half 
of 1970, CRISP underlined that ‘the workers' conditions’ were consid-
ered as  artificially very difficult in the sense that they ‘blamed them on 
the unwillingness  of the management or the harshness  of bosses’ 
[1970] and not on a natural constraint, as  in the mines, or on a techni-
cal constraint, as in the blast furnaces. 
11. Furthermore, these strikes  also brought out a very clear split be-
tween the workers and the trade union organisations  which were sup-
posed to represent them. According to CRISP, the attitude of workers 
at the origin of the movement – ‘foreigners for the most part (but not 
only)’ – ‘was rather favourable to unions, which they hoped would take 
things in hand as  soon as they were ‘enlightened’ on the actual situa-
tion. These workers  would therefore gradually discover the degree and 
the forms of institutionalisation of Belgian trade unionism, for example 
through the length of validity of agreements or the length of the repre-
sentatives’ terms’ [1970]. While the trade union organisations  quickly 
regained control of the movement at Nestor Martin and Citroën, the 
same was  not true at Michelin. In this factory, the opposition between, 
on the one hand, the Comité Ouvrier and the strikers and, on the other 
hand, the union structures  symbolised mainly by the Brussels  section of 
the chemicals  sector of the FGTB Centrale Générale, was a main as-
pect of the dispute for a long time. 
12. Finally, in these disputes, ‘national solidarity reinforced class  soli-
darity’ thus revealing ‘a  phenomenon apparently ignored or at least 
rarely taken into consideration by public opinion and by management 
2
1 With respect to the social consequences of the strike, Pierre Tilly points out that ‘despite the breach of the social peace, the principle of social dialogue emerges strengthened in the long 
term, like the consultation with social partners, the principle of a national and interprofessional agreement’ [2011]. It goes hand in hand with ‘the strengthening of a market economy guided 
by a distribution of the fruits of growth backed by the stakeholders during the 1954 declaration regarding productivity. For more than a decade, until the mid 1970s, this Fordist compro-
mise guaranteed full employment overall despite the sirens of the Walloon decline which are starting to be heard’ [Tilly, 2011].
2 As noted by Michel Capron, ‘At the dawn of the 1970s, turbulence emerged in the working-class struggle, where all of the components of the working class are mixed and whose forms 
of action, from company to company, go from massive strike pickets to demonstrations in the streets, and include surprise strikes and occupations. The workers' action was rejuvenated: 
undisciplined, imaginative, enthusiastic just like its protagonists, and violent when it shakes and weakens the foundations of social dialogue’ [1988].
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and labour: the formation of true class  communities  in the different na-
tional groups of foreign workers. These communities – which had for a 
long time been centred on aid for militant workers  in Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, etc. – gradually discovered the reality of the working-class 
struggle in Belgium; while for a  long time they had limited themselves to 
following the movements  triggered by workers  of Belgian nationality at 
Michelin as  well as  at Citroën and in Limburg, they instead showed 
some initiative’ [CRISP, 1970]. In fact, with these disputes, a  wave of 
immigration – often arriving in Belgium for political reasons  – appeared 
on the labour scene. 
3. The more recent disputes: from 1980 to 2010
13. In a context of deep economic crisis, in many respects the 1980s 
constituted a pivotal decade. At political level, the neo-liberal doctrine 
was  beginning to triumph, as  evidenced by the coming to power of 
Thatcher in Great Britain and Reagan in the United States. It was  also 
at this  time that a major modernisation movement took shape in com-
panies, in terms of new information and communication technologies 
as well as  the revival of managerial  ideas and practices: ‘just-in-time’ 
production, participative management by quality circles, company cul-
ture, human resources management, etc. 
14. Although Brussels  was  still the biggest industrial city in the country 
in the mid 1970s, i.e. at the beginning of the economic crisis, deindus-
trialisation was  more pronounced there. From 1970 to 2000, manufac-
turing employment dropped by nearly 75% in Brussels  compared with 
nearly 50% in the country as  a whole. The only noteworthy exception 
was  VW Forest, by far the biggest industrial company in Brussels. At 
the beginning of the 2000s, the German manufacturer created an addi-
tional 1000 jobs  [Vandermotten, 2005]. This  exception finally ended in 
2006 when VW left and the site was taken over by Audi.
15. With respect to the social dynamics in Brussels, deindustrialisation 
led to the shutting down of the main ‘bastions’ of the working-class 
struggles from the end of the ‘post-war economic boom’: Citroën 
closed its  doors  in 1980 followed by Michelin and Nestor Martin in 
1986. More broadly, the deindustrialisation movement caused the 
working-class  concentrations  to disappear and created a  feeling of so-
cial vulnerability among workers  and the working classes. At the same 
time, many jobs were lost in the inner suburbs  of Brussels with the 
shutting down of Renault Vilvoorde in 1997,3 the bankruptcy of Sabena 
in 2001 and the decision by DHL in 2004 to move its  intercontinental 
‘hub’ from Zaventem to Leipzig in former East Germany. 
16. Unlike the 1960s, this  time the disappearance of industrial jobs 
was  at the origin of many disputes whose central issue was to obtain 
the best redundancy arrangements  possible. The question of the safe-
guarding of employment gradually became secondary or even anecdo-
tal. However, beginning in 1990, FGTB in Brussels attempted to reverse 
the process  by making deindustrialisation a major regional issue. It felt 
that the preservation of industrial jobs  was essential in order to respond 
to the specificities of unemployment in Brussels, which affected ‘many 
unskilled and immigrant workers’, and to prevent ‘Brussels from be-
coming a vast zone of offices’ [FGTB/Brussels, 1993]. One of the moti-
vating factors behind this  position was  the threat to jobs  in three indus-
trial companies  in the region: the battery manufacturer Doyen (250 
workers) in Anderlecht, the Illochroma printing works  (400 workers) in 
Uccle and Carcoke-Marly (310 jobs)  in Neder-Over-Heembeek. While 
the first company had plans  to relocate in order to meet its expansion 
needs, the location of the other two companies was  questioned – as a 
sign of the times – due to the environmental pollution they caused. 
17. In Brussels, the decline in industrial employment went hand in 
hand with the development of the service sector, which was  partly the 
result of the transformation of ‘industrial’ jobs  into jobs providing ‘serv-
ices to companies’ via subcontracting mechanisms. For workers, this 
transfer to the service economy often resulted in a deterioration of 
3
3 In this regard, Antoine Bevort and Annette Jobert underline that, for certain observers, the dispute caused by the shutting down of Vilvoorde marked a turning point in European mobilisa-
tions ‘with the first one-hour strike at all of the European sites and a demonstration on 16 March 1997 in Brussels, gathering more than 70,000 people’ [2008]. 
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working conditions  related to the shift from one joint commission to another 
and to the emergence of a logic favouring undeclared work and the use of 
illegal immigrants  in a city with ‘a large reserve of illegal labour’ [FGTB/
Brussels, 2006]. These new organisational practices also made union 
work much more difficult in addition to hindering the emergence of an 
individual or collective voice [Hirschman, 1974], i.e. the ability to speak 
out and, by extension, commit to the struggle.
18. While VW Forest had been an exception with respect to the dein-
dustrialisation movement for many years, the same was  true with re-
gard to the labour dispute. The open dispute was  a  strong dimension 
of the collective labour relations. In 1990, its  chairman and CEO said 
that he was  ‘exasperated’ by the two different faces of the trade un-
ions: ‘Modern trade unionism in the texts and doctrines, and dynamic 
trade unionism on the ground.’4 More precisely, these disputes  above 
all revealed issues related to the technological, organisational and 
managerial modernisation of big companies  deeply rooted in the Tay-
lorist and Fordist tradition [Bouquin, 2006]. At the same time, the work-
ers at VW were very active in the struggles against the austerity policies 
such as  the general plan in 1993  and the generation pact in 2005. To 
some extent, it was a symbolic continuation of the workers’ struggles 
at Citroën, Michelin and Nestor Martin at the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s. 
19. Beginning in the 1980s, the negotiation of social plans became a 
major issue in the labour disputes. These disputes were in keeping with 
a purely defensive approach.
3.1. The negotiation of social plans
20. The negotiation of social plans followed the decision to undergo 
restructuring aimed either at reducing the workforce or at simply closing 
a site. The shutting down of a site was at the heart of three disputes 
which were particularly symbolic of the deindustrialisation of Brussels: 
Côte d’Or in 1988, Philip Morris in 1993 and Volkswagen in 2006. 
3.1.1. Côte d’Or
21. In 1987-88, the multinational Jacobs Suchard took over Côte 
d’Or, which had been a family business  until then. Soon afterwards, the 
management announced a strategic plan – called ‘1992’ – involving the 
removal of 270 jobs, the redundancy of 500 people and the construc-
tion of an ‘ultramodern’ factory in the Halle industrial zone, intended to 
replace the one in Rue Bara, close to the South Station. Following the 
announcement of this  plan, the staff of this  ‘vénérable maison bruxel-
loise’ – according to the time-honoured expression – went on strike for 
the first time in 35 years.
22. An agreement was made after 13  days  of strikes. Although the 
workers did not succeed in preventing the relocation, the strike allowed 
a reduction in the number of job cuts  and redundancies  (from 500 to 
348) while obtaining high wage compensations for the workers  who 
lost their jobs. In her analysis of the dispute, Bénédicte Vaes, a journal-
ist at Le Soir, underlined that while ‘the employees’ confederations 
tried, in vain, to renegotiate the restructuring’, ‘the workers’ confedera-
tions  – which have a major role – accepted most of the rationalisations 
in exchange for 90%  of the net income for six years for the people who 
would be laid off without benefitting from an early retirement pension. 
For the workers, six years  of wages  was  obviously a very enticing per-
spective, especially as  the wages  were high – in exchange for difficult 
working conditions  – in the "conches" department which acted as  a 
trigger.’ According to the journalist, the unions  succeeded in ‘raising the 
social bidding, without changing the direction of economic decisions.’5 
3.1.2. Philip Morris
23. At the end of 1993, the workers  at the Philip Morris  site in Ixelles 
received a letter announcing that ‘drastic measures’ would soon be 
taken in order to allow the group to ‘remain a  healthy company at inter-
national level’ [Detroyer and Krzeslo, 1994]. A few months later, the 
management of the Belgian division announced the shutting down of its 
factory in Ixelles, which employed 512 people in the manufacturing of 
4
4 Trends-Tendances, 6 September 1990.
5 Le Soir, 5 October 1988. ‘Conchage’ is a chocolate refining process. 
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cigarettes. Acting as  a common front, the workers occupied the factory 
and organised different actions such as the blocking of other Belgian 
sites of the American multinational. 
24. Very symbolically, the result of these actions was to delay the shut-
ting down of the site by one month. The agreement also stipulated that 
the workers would be able to benefit from the early retirement pension 
as of age 50, that they would be informed first of any jobs  available in 
the company – Philip Morris  still has a head office in Watermael-
Boitsfort, a  factory in Forest and a distribution centre in Zaventem – and 
that those who wished to retrain or go into business on their own 
would receive a bonus. While the early retirement pension had become 
the usual means of managing excess staff due to restructuring, the last 
two points were quite innovative. 
3.1.3. VW Forest
25. On several occasions, there had been more or less explicit threats 
of major job cuts  at the VW site in Forest, and even of shutting down. 
This  scenario finally became a reality at the end of 2006 and the begin-
ning of 2007. Following the company’s  poor results, the German work-
ers accepted an increase in their working hours  – in particular by doing 
away with the four-day week in the factories  in deficit in West Germany 
– with no wage increase in exchange for the increase in production; this 
could only result in reduced production outside Germany. In this  con-
text, during the 21 November works council meeting, the management 
of VW Forest announced that 4,000 jobs  would be cut and that the 
production of the Golf would be transferred to Germany. 
26. Following this  announcement, the factory in Forest was  paralysed 
for seven weeks  by a particularly long and hard strike. The struggle for 
the future of the site also led to a  show of solidarity gathering between 
15,000 and 25,000 people, many negotiations  as well as various inter-
ventions  on behalf of politicians  such as  Liberal Prime Minister Guy Ver-
hofstadt, whose intervention was given a lot of media coverage. At the 
beginning of December, the management of VW hinted that the Forest 
site could be used for the production of the Audi  A1, which would 
guarantee employment for nearly 3,000 workers from 2009 to 2016 
and would put an end to the speculations regarding plans to shut down 
the site in two phases. However, the German management had certain 
conditions, such as  an improvement of the competitiveness  of the site 
in Brussels. 
27. In the end, the unions  succeeded in negotiating particularly advan-
tageous  conditions for the workers  who would lose their jobs, with sev-
erance bonuses varying between €25,000 and €144,000 according to 
length of service, which is ‘unique and exceptional with respect to Bel-
gian standards.’6  On 19 December, the early retirement pension was 
the object of an agreement which stipulated that the workers  would be 
able to benefit from an early retirement pension as  of age 50 instead of 
age 55, in principle. The agreement also stipulated that VW would be 
responsible for 100% (for the workers) and 90% (for the employees)  of 
the difference between the last gross  monthly salary and the unem-
ployment benefits, which equals  an ‘exceptional concession’. In mid 
February, the negotiations regarding redundancy arrangements  for em-
ployees also had a  very positive outcome. On the one hand, the unions 
were able to limit the number of forced redundancies  to less  than 100. 
On the other hand, they obtained severance bonuses between 
€29,000 and €196,000, according to length of service. 
28. However, the agreements made with subcontractors were far less 
advantageous  for the workers  given a much less  favourable balance of 
power due to the size of the subcontracting companies and the dis-
tance between the places  of negotiation. But the bitter pill was  swal-
lowed by the workers  who went from VW to Audi. In a  position of 
power, the management of Audi demanded and obtained major con-
cessions  in exchange for its  establishment in Forest. Thus, the remain-
ing workers  had to accept a 20% reduction in their wages  and new 
flexibility measures at work, such as  the 'plus  minus conto' allowing the 
working time to be adapted according to the life cycle of the model 
produced.
5
6 Le Soir, 8 December 2007.
Jean VANDEWATTYNE, 
From the Golden Sixties to 2010: half a century of 
deindustrialisation and labour disputes in Brussels, 
Brussels Studies, Number 93, 
November 16th 2015, www.brusselsstudies.be
3.2. The other reasons for the labour dispute 
29. Even if it is  often a question of restructuring, certain labour dis-
putes bring out other tensions and issues. This  is  the case with the de-
fence of union rights, the consequences of the use of subcontracting 
and the reduction in working time.
3.2.1. Union rights
30. In the cases  analysed, the defence of union rights  does  not ap-
pear to be at the origin of the dispute. On the contrary, it is  above all 
the expression of an intensification of the dispute following the man-
agement's  wish to lay off union representatives considered as  too ‘an-
noying’ or ‘radical’. This  was the case in particular in 2000 at Léonidas 
and in 2008  at Italian Automotive Center (IAC), the official distributor of 
Fiat in Belgium. 
31. At Léonidas (250 workers) in Anderlecht, the origin of the dispute 
was  the management's  wish to introduce teamwork and to reduce the 
workforce in order to cope with the negative evolution of the market. 
Due to the opposition it faced with respect to its  project, in January 
2000, the management decided to make eight workers redundant. In 
reaction to this, the union delegation announced its  intention to call a 
strike. The management then proceeded to lay off two representatives 
considered as ‘annoying’, and the workers, acting as  a common front, 
went on strike. A legal decision put an end to the strike by threatening 
the strikers  with a penalty payment of 200,000 BEF – €5,000 – per day 
and per person prevented from working. An agreement was  made 
nearly three months  later. It ended in the redundancy of 73  workers, 
including the two representatives, in exchange for a  social plan consist-
ing of additional financial compensation for the redundant workers  and 
access  to training for those who wished to reintegrate themselves in 
other sectors of activity. 
32. At IAC (90 jobs), the dispute followed the announcement at the 
end of 2008  of a new restructuring plan proposing the shutting down of 
‘company divisions’, i.e. the Delta shop and the Meiser workshop, and 
the redundancy of 25 workers, 12 of whom were covered by the law of 
19 March 1991 on the protection of union representatives. The dispute 
became more radical in April when the workers  showed their discon-
tent in the offices where a  meeting was being held between the man-
agement and the union delegation. On this  occasion, the management 
spoke of detention, which the workers and their representatives  con-
tested. Following this incident, the events moved on quickly with an 
important judicial aspect. In mid May, the dispute took a new direction 
with the dismissal of five workers  ‘for gross  misconduct’, three of 
whom were union representatives. On 3 November, the Labour Court 
agreed with the union theory according to which IAC must be consid-
ered as a technical operational unit. Two days  later, the Labour Court 
considered that the workers  were not guilty of ‘serious  misconduct’ in 
the framework of their union struggle, and in its  judgement it underlined 
that the participation in a strike and a  demonstration ‘does  not exceed 
the limits  of the right to strike which all workers  are entitled to. It is  an 
individual labour law issue which deserves  as  much protection as the 
employer's property right.'7 
33. Finally, at the end of November, the management of IAC stated 
that they wished to move on, and notified nine union representatives of 
their redundancy. In a press release, SETCa, FGTB Métal, CSC Métal 
and CNE estimated that the financial cost of this  decision was  equiva-
lent to nearly 50 years  of wages  for the nine representatives  and they 
hoped that this ‘disaster’ would serve as an ‘example to employers, 
demonstrating that the use of force, the anti-union frontal attack and 
the jurisdiction of a restructuring lead to catastrophe’. 
3.2.2. The externalisation of activities and the use of subcon-
tracting
34. Beginning in the 1980s, under the influence of Japanese man-
agement in particular, companies  have gradually refocused on their 
basic trades  and have entrusted the least strategic activities  to subcon-
tractors [Rorive, 2006]. In 2004, at VW Forest, this  policy led to the 
‘Automotive Park’, which grouped together the company's main sup-
pliers  in an area connected to the factory. Due to its  impact on workers, 
the use of subcontracting has added to the labour dispute over the 
6
7 Brussels Labour Court, RG 2009/AB/52381. Available at the address: http://www.terralaboris.be/IMG/pdf_CTB_2009_11_05_2009_AB_52381.pdf
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past three decades. This is  the case in particular in the cleaning sector, 
whose development is  due greatly to outsourcing practices, and to 
Godiva, a company which is emblematic of the Brussels economy. 
35. On 1 March 2010, the management of Godiva  (360 workers  in 
Koekelberg) announced to the works council that it intended to refocus 
its  activities  in Brussels on the manufacturing of chocolate. It would 
thus  subcontract the packaging of its  products  to a sheltered work-
shop and cut 90 jobs. The company then idled for two weeks. It 
stopped operations  completely on 16 March during the meeting be-
tween the union delegation and the Brussels  Employment Minister. The 
case is  particularly symbolic with regard to the unemployment problem 
in Brussels, in the sense that the jobs which the management of Go-
diva planned to cut were held by low-skilled women who lived mainly in 
the Brussels region. 
36. The dispute intensified when the management announced its in-
tention to resort to a ‘lock-out’ – a practice which is  used very little by 
employers  – as of 12 April. It finally implemented the threat a few days 
earlier due to the workers' violation of ‘their contractual obligations’ and 
‘safety and fire regulations’. The dispute finally ended following the in-
tervention of social conciliators  whose proposal involved the redeploy-
ment of 12 workers within the company, the early retirement pension as 
of age 52, additional early retirement pension compensation covering 
80% of the difference between the net salary and the unemployment 
benefit, the preservation of hospital insurance for those who had taken 
an early retirement and the payment of normal wages  to all workers 
during ‘lock-out’ days. 
3.2.3. The reduction in working time 
37. Beginning in the 1980s, the demand for a reduction in working 
time gradually lost ground due to the flexibility requirements  of man-
agement. VW Forest is a particularly symbolic example of this trend. 
38. In 1991, the VW workers  began their fight in favour of a 35-hour 
work week. While this demand appeared to be a  response to the man-
agement's  wish to reduce staff, it was  also in keeping with a European 
strategy whose starting point was  for German workers  in the metal in-
dustry to obtain 35 hours  beginning in October 1995. Immediately fol-
lowing this  victory, the VW European Works  Council was committed to 
obtaining 35 hours  for all of the company's workers  in Europe.8  The 
strike in Forest was a  realisation of this commitment. It lasted six days 
without, however, making any headway in terms of working time. 
39. The reduction in working time reappeared in 1994 in the frame-
work of the negotiation regarding the renewal of the company's  collec-
tive labour agreement. This  negotiation led to another big dispute in 
which the VW board of directors  underlined the existence of a  structural 
overcapacity in the group, more or less  corresponding to the produc-
tion capacity of the Brussels  factory. This declaration, which was inter-
preted as a form of ‘blackmail’, resulted in making the strikers' position 
more radical. The strike was  then declared to the finish. Following the 
workers' rejection of a preliminary agreement, the management de-
clared an ‘illegal strike’ and asked the non-striking staff to be at the 
factory gates. At the same time, it obtained a judgement ordering a 
penalty payment of 100,000 BEF per day and per person prevented 
from working. The risk of seeing the dispute degenerate weighed heav-
ily on the negotiation and the strategies of stakeholders. Finally, it 
ended in the signature of a  three-year collective agreement including 
the establishment of the 36-hour week.
40. In 1997, the workers  at VW obtained 35 hours  for the daytime 
team and 32 hours for the night-time team. It is  interesting to point out 
that the negotiation for this  new reduction in working time did not lead 
to a stoppage or a strike, even when the management had mentioned 
that 1,500 jobs would be cut.
41. The working time issue resurfaced once again in 2006 with the 
arrival of Audi in Forest. In exchange for its establishment there, the 
management of Audi demanded and obtained a major reduction in 
wages and flexibility measures  at work, which resulted in a return to 38 
hours and the working time being adapted according to the life cycle of 
the product.
7
8 With the exception of SEAT in Spain. 
Jean VANDEWATTYNE, 
From the Golden Sixties to 2010: half a century of 
deindustrialisation and labour disputes in Brussels, 
Brussels Studies, Number 93, 
November 16th 2015, www.brusselsstudies.be
Conclusion
42. With respect to the industrial dimension as  well as  labour disputes, 
the dynamics seen in Brussels go well beyond the city limits. 
43. On the one hand, deindustrialisation is  not at all specific to Brus-
sels. This  movement is  seen in all of the long industrialised regions  of 
Europe. The differences  which may exist are related especially to the 
period when the process  began and to its speed. In Brussels, deindus-
trialisation was  first seen at the beginning of the 1960s, and continued 
– with the emerging economic crisis  – at a  faster speed than in the 
other regions of the country. In the context of the Golden Sixties, dein-
dustrialisation does not seem to have led to large-scale social strug-
gles. This  is  explained mostly by a job market characterised by full em-
ployment, the fact that job losses  were mainly due to small- and 
medium-sized companies  and that part of these losses were the result 
of a  relocation to the hinterland of the Brussels  region. The situation 
was  quite different following the economic crisis. At that time, the re-
structuring became the object of many social struggles  in the Brussels 
region as in many other regions. With the crisis, places which were 
emblematic of the labour dispute at the end of the 1960s  and the be-
ginning of the 1970s also closed permanently. 
44. On the other hand, the disputes analysed are also in keeping with 
wider dynamics. Like elsewhere in Europe, the significant disputes at 
the end of the post-war economic boom were essentially offensive and 
qualitative. They were also led by immigrant workers who were still re-
ferred to by some as  'foreigners'. Under the weight of the economic 
crisis  and new managerial policies  – which, from the beginning of the 
1980s, would reshape the reality of work and organisations in the sec-
ondary as  well as tertiary sectors – the strikes  became above all defen-
sive, with the negotiation of social plans as  their main issue. Very atypi-
cally, the last great trade union victory goes  back to 1997, with the im-
plementation of the 35-hour week at VW. This  victory owes much to 
the influence of IG Metal in Germany and its wish to use the reduction 
in working time to fight unemployment. 
45. Finally, it is  interesting to note that industrial leadership in Brussels 
has  not resulted in particularly vocal and combative trade unionism at 
national level. This is  probably due to the fact that small- and medium-
sized industries  have made up a significant part of the industrial fabric, 
unlike, for example, in Charleroi and Liège. Moreover, many industrial 
jobs have been held by commuters, which has  had an impact on the 
collective dynamics.9 This  dissociation between the place of work and 
the living place in effect raises  the issue of pertinent communities  in 
collective action [Segrestin, 1980] while making mobilisations  more dif-
ficult. 
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